The articles collected in this Special Issue do not provide answers to all these questions, and we certainly do not aim to supply a comprehensive intellectual history of resistance. Nor do we seek to arrive at anything like an essentialist definition of the term. Rather, the aim has been to offer a sequence of snapshots of how resistance has been conceived in a variety of historical and intellectual contexts (albeit limited to Europe and North America) over a relatively extended time-frame. As regular readers of History of European Ideas hardly need reminding, resistance did not begin in the mid-twentieth century, with the Nazi occupation of France or with the struggles of formerly colonised nations throwing off the shackles of European colonial rule. Debates about resistance have been central to political thought throughout the entire period between the Protestant Reformation and the early twenty-first century. The following articles share a common ambition to understand the complexities of political thinking about resistance over this longue durée, and to grasp the ways that resistance has interacted with conceptions of religious authority and heresy, Enlightenment, republicanism and monarchism, rights (natural, human and civil), democracy, revolution, representation, race, and freedom. Several contributors relate historical debates about resistance to contemporary puzzles in political thought. One outcome has been to show that answers to the questions of who resists, and what requires resisting, have varied considerably across time and space. But it is also worth noting that certain conceptual dilemmas have tended to recur -in part because thinkers have proved willing to adapt older intellectual resources in confronting novel situations.
Intellectual history tends to be most powerful in challenging preconceptions about the essential meaning of political concepts, and this seems particularly true for the idea of resistance. As is often noted, resistance is a term that seems impervious to stable definition. 3 The term has a number of conceptual neighbours which are not quite its synonyms, and sometimes even function as its antonyms: dissent, rebellion, opposition, revolt, insurrection, revolution, protest, civil disobedience, conscientious objection. It can even shade into terrorism -depending (of course) on your point of view. Untangling these terminological distinctions, as is shown in several of the following articles, can provide a clearer picture of what resistance has meant in specific contexts. But resistance is multivalent in a deeper sense. As this collection suggests, the language of resistance has been put to many different purposes, and cannot straightforwardly be equated with specific intellectual traditions (such as Protestantism, or republicanism) or with a fixed position on the political spectrum.
Resistance can be an activity of conservatives as much as of radicals: as the German The following collection also tracks some major changes in perceptions of what exactly requires resisting. In the ancient world, the object of resistance was standardly assumed to be tyranny, and spectacular acts of tyrannicide -most obviously the assassination of Julius Caesar in 44BC -became part-and-parcel of republican and "monarchomach" theories of Yet monarchical tyranny has never been the sole criterion of legitimate resistance, and this seems particularly true for the period since the American and French Revolutions. It has recently been shown, for instance, that the "patriot royalists" of the American Revolution directed their resistance against the British imperial parliament, as distinct from the infamous "tyranny" of George III. 15 The related problems of resisting popular power and legislative despotism also feature in my own article on Benjamin Constant and Alexis de Tocqueville, which seeks to detail some of the ways in which resistance was reconceptualised in the light of the French revolutionary Terror and Napoleon's imperial regime. I suggest that Constant was exercised by the problem of resisting the potential for oppression latent in "plebiscitary"
republics, and that Tocqueville saw a need to resist some of the more nebulous features of modern egalitarian democracies, most notably the conformist pressures exerted by majority opinion. 16 The meanings of resistance were further expanded in the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, as thinkers and actors added forms of imperial, economic, racial and sexual domination to the traditional list of entities that demanded resistance. an ethic of contestatory citizenship, we might say, is not enough. 27 One path we have not attempted to pursue here, but which would repay careful historical study, is that of socialist and Marxist languages of resistance from the first half of the nineteenth century onwards. people -either as the collective of all citizens or as a sectional group of poorer citizens -also run through Hamilton's discussion of resistance in invigorating representative democracies.
Another cluster of issues that has featured repeatedly in this collection has been the relationship between resistance and revolution or, from a different perspective, between resistance and the maintenance of constitutional order. Perhaps the most famous attempt to integrate resistance within an existing constitutional structure was that made by the marquis de Condorcet in the 1790s, an attempt that earned Condorcet a predictably critical response in Carl Schmitt's Die Diktatur. For Schmitt, the idea of institutionalising resistance was a typically inadequate liberal evasion: "Insofar as one 'organises' it, one denaturalises it; as soon as one rationalises it, it remains rationed." 33 Several of the following articles highlight the interest generated by questions of resistance's connection to revolution and constitutional order. Duthille, for instance, notes that one problem facing "Court Whig" thinkers, unlike the Dissenters, was that of endorsing the events of 1688-89 while simultaneously seeking to downplay the legitimacy of revolutionary resistance in Hanoverian Britain. 34 It has been argued elsewhere that this represents a recurrent dilemma for all post-revolutionary regimes:
strong claims about resistance to oppression are all-too-readily renounced once a revolutionary government is firmly ensconced in power. 35 While in some sense this issue was present in Kant's reflections on both 1688 and the French Revolution, the main object of debate in Germany was rather different. 36 As Maliks shows, mid-eighteenth-century German thinkers like Wolff and Achenwall justified a "legal" right to both resistance and revolution on consequentialist grounds. It was precisely this claim that Kant sought to demolish, since admitting any "legal" right to assess the rectitude of government amounted to the unravelling of the legal constitution itself. 37 These concerns about the relationship between resistance and constitutional order also play out in the three final contributions. My own article briefly considers Constant's anxieties about the delicate judgements involved in any call to revolutionary resistance, but focuses more fully on the extent to which both he and Tocqueville sought to institutionalise forms of opposition within the design of modern polities, which they perceived as necessary in light of centrifugal tendencies towards the centralization of state power. 38 Ashcroft offers a detailed examination of how Arendt conceived of the relationship between resistance and constitutional legitimacy. She argues that Arendt's position was less tamely constitutionalist than is often assumed, and to some extent opened up a path towards genuinely revolutionary political action, so long as certain guiding principles (publicity; plurality) remained in place.
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Hamilton also confronts questions about the possible means and implications of institutionalising resistance, addressing Sheldon Wolin's argument that representative institutions tend to make for democracy's attenuation. 40 But Hamilton concludes that modern democracies can and must incorporate a capacity for resistance within their constitutional design. A key inspiration for his argument lies in a recovery of aspects of republican thought, including the plebeian tribunate (as presented by Machiavelli) and a framework for constitutional revision (as conceived by Condorcet).
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The following articles were first presented at a conference on the theme of "Resistance in
Intellectual History and Political Thought," held at the University of Sussex in September 2016. The relevance of the topic has shown little sign of diminishing since then, as resistance continues to be practised, articulated and debated in a wide variety of domestic and international settings. Some of these are hopeful, others appear to be tragic. What is clear from the current situation is that resistance remains central to modern politics, but that its meaning remains unusually controversial. (This seems to be true even when one compares resistance with other notoriously contested terms in our political vocabulary, such as "liberty"
or "state"). What we have tried to highlight here is the multifaceted character of historical discussions of resistance, the competing intellectual resources that were brought to bear upon the problem, and the complexity of interactions between resistance and broader conceptions of political, ethical, and religious life. Such a project, obviously, cannot provide guidance for the negotiation of the ethical, legal and strategic dilemmas that inevitably accompany 
